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Afterword: 
Could a Merger Lead to Both 
a Monopoly and a Lower Price? 
Alan A. Fishert 
Robert H. Lande:j: 
and 
Walter Vandaele! 
Economists and Congress frequently speak at such cross purposes 
in merger analysis that they might as well be speaking different lan-
guages. Economists typically analyze merger effects solely in terms of 
efficiency and tend not to consider final product price explicitly. I Con-
gress, however, enacted the antimerger laws largely to prevent firms 
from using mergers to obtain greater market power, raise prices, and 
thereby acquire some consumer surplus from purchasers of the prod-
ucts.2 Efficiency was a much lower priority for Congress; the most im-
t Economist, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Co=ission; B.A., M.A. 1968, Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles; Ph.D. 1973, University of California, Berkeley. 
:j: Attorney, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission; B.A. 1974, Northwestern 
University; J.D. 1978, Harvard University; M.P.P. 1978, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University. * Economic Advisor to the Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Co=ission. 
Lie. 1966, University of St. Ignatius, Antwerpen, Belgium; Drs. 1969, Katholicke Hogeschool, 
Tilburg, l'letherlands; M.B.A. 1973, University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1975, University of Chicago. 
The opinions in this Afterword are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily refiect 
the official opinions of the Bureaus of Competition or Economics, of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, or of any individual commissioner. The authors thank Gregg Jarrell, James C. Miller III, 
and Peter Ross for many insightful co=ents on earlier drafts. 
1. Economists focus on maximizing allocative efficiency-determining the rate of output 
that maximizes the total wealth of society-regardless of whether consumer prices increase or 
decrease. See, eg., E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS THEORY AND ApPLICATIONS 438-42 (1982). 
Indeed, as Professor Williamson observed, "This transformation of benefits from one form (con-
sumers' surplus) to another (profit) [Le., wealth transfer] is treated as a wash under the conven-
tional welfare economics model." Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust j)efense Revisited, 125 
U. PA. L. REV. 699, 711 (1977). 
Even attorneys who have analyzed the market-power/efficiencies tradeoff have used the 
economists' framework. See, e.g., 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw'l 939, at 147-48 
(1980); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 107-12 (1978); Liebeler, Market Power and Competi-
tive Superiority in Concentrated Industries, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1231, 1260-66 (1978); Muris, The 
EJliciency j)efense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (1980). 
2. See generally Fisher & Lande, EJliciency Considerations in Merger E%rcement, 72 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1580 (1983). For a more extensive treatment, see Lande, Wealth Transfers as the 
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The EJliciency Interpretation Cha//enged, 34 HASTINGS 
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portant consideration was that firms not use mergers to enable them to 
raise consumer prices.3 
This communications gap permeates what has become known as 
Williamsonian tradeoff analysis.4 Suppose that a merger simultane-
ously created both efficiencies and increased market power. Econo-
mists debate how much of a decrease in costs (increased productive 
efficiency) would exactly compensate for the allocative inefficiency of 
increased monopoly power, ignoring the effect of primary interest to 
Congress in passing the antimerger laws: the wealth transfer from con-
sumers to the business firms gaining increased market power. Since 
Congress cared little about efficiency and was unwilling to tolerate 
increased market power sufficient to transfer wealth from consumers to 
the business sector, it is not surprising that the courts have refused to 
consider an efficiency justification for mergers likely to result in higher 
consumer prices.s 
In this Afterword, we reverse the analysis and focus on the ques-
tion of interest to Congress: What are the cost savings and other condi-
tions necessary to guarantee that a merger that created a monopoly 
would not raise prices and thus would involve no wealth transfer from 
consumers to producers?6 In other words, we derive the conditions 
under which a merger transforming an industry from competitive to 
monopoly pricing could sufficiently decrease marginal costs to lead to a 
L.J. 65 (1982). Even Professor Bork stated in the closely related context of the legislative history 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act, "The touchstone of illegality is raising prices to consumers. There 
were no exceptions." Bork, Legislative Intent and The Policy of The Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 
7, 16 (1966). 
3. Congress also had incipiency and other concerns. For simplicity, we ignore these consid-
erations. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 2, at 1587-1599; Lande, supra note 2, at 126-40. 
4. Oliver Williamson made the first effective argument that efficiencies should count in 
favor of rather than against the legality of a merger in his landmark article, Williamson, Econo-
mies as an AntitnlSt Defense: The Welfare Tradeojft, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). For addi-
tional discussion, including citations to much of the literature that developed from Williamson's 
analysis and used his methodology, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 2. 
5. For a history of the judicial treatment of merger efficiencies under Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 2, at 1593-1599. 
6. If consumer prices did not increase, net efficiency would increase without adversely af-
fecting consumers (Le., there would be no wealth transfer to the business sector). Since a merger 
that left unchanged or lowered final product price would not make any consumers worse off, it 
would meet the one welfare criterion that economists almost universally accept: Pareto optimal-
ity. A market situation is Pareto optimal if no person can be made better off (according to his 
preferences) without simultaneously making someone else worse off. Mansfield, supra note I, at 
440: Of course, competitor firms not achieving similar cost savings would be worse off after sueh a 
merger-unless they could also merge and obtain comparable efficiencies. Congress, however, 
was more concerned with cousumer welfare than with the welfare of specific business firms. 
Lande, supra note 2, at 101-05, 120-21, 139-40. Mergers that improve allocative efficiency but 
transfer wealth from consumers to producers are not Pareto optimal. Although in theory the 
producers could compensate consumers for their lost wealth and still have a net gain, such pay-
ments would involve transaction and political costs so high that they would be impractical. 
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new monopoly price as low as or lower than the premerger competitive 
price.7 
For simplicity, we adopt the extreme assumption that the merger 
will transform a fully competitive market into a single-firm monopoly 
or carteL8 For any merger likely to be attempted in the present anti-
trust environment, such a transformation would have only a modest 
probability of occurring. Since we assume the maximum possible an-
ticompetitive potential of any merger, our calculations vastly overstate 
both the probable anticompetitive effect of a merger and the cost sav-
ings required to keep prices from rising. Naturally, the calculations 
also greatly overstate the cost savings necessary to offset any possible 
market-power effects if, contrary to the wishes of Congress, one used 
the conventional economic criterion of maximizing allocative efficiency 
and ignored any wealth-transfer effects. 
Consider Diagram 1.9 For any point C along demand curve AB, 
one can calculate the elasticity of demand, '1"), as 'I") = !~, where the bar 
indicates linear distance. IO The lower the price, the lower the elasticity 
of demand; the higher the price, the higher the elasticity of demand. 
Therefore, one can address the question of when the competitive price 
would exceed the postmerger monopoly price by asking when the com-
petitive elasticity of demand would exceed the monopoly elasticity of 
demand. II In the equations below, superscripts C, M, and *, respec-
tively, denote "premerger competitive," "postmerger monopolistic," 
and "hypothetical postmerger competitive." To demonstrate when the 
premerger competitive elasticity would exceed the postmerger monop-
7. Williamson, in contrast, assumed that a merger creating market power would raise price; 
he never addressed the question that we address here. Williamson, S/Ipra note 4; Williamson, 
Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Correction and Reply, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 1372 (1968); Wil-
liamson, Alfocatire Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC., May 
1969, at 105; Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Reply, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 954 
(1969); WILLIAMSON, S/Ipra note 1. 
8. Given present merger enforcement, the relevant concern is collusion rather than monop-
olization. For a discussion of the effects of alternative assumptions on the tradeoff between price 
increases and efficiencies, see Fisher & Lande, S/Ipra note 2, at 1624-51. 
9. To simplify the analysis, we assume straight-line demand, constant marginal costs, and 
significant barriers to entry. 
10. J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND ApPLICATIONS 119 (1976). We define 1] as tlte ab-
solute value of the elasticity of demand. 
11. This statement holds for a concave or a linear demand curve, or for a convex demand 
curve not more convex than unitary elasticity. Concave and linear demand curves both imply that 
at some sufficiently high price, consumers would not purchase any of the product in questiou, and 
that at a zero price consumers would purchase a finite quantity. A convex demand curve implies 
that consumers would purchase some of the product even at an infinitely high price and would 
want an infinite amount of the good at a zero price. For a technical explanation of the properties 
of concave and convex functions, see A. CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL 
ECONOMICS 255-56 (1974). 
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oly demand elasticity, we must derive the relationships among these 
parameters; these, in tum, depend on the relationships among marginal 




Q. B Quantity 
From simple geometry and the definition of price elasticity of de-











For an x-percent decrease in marginal costs, we can express the new 
marginal costs as: 
(2) MC* = (l-x)MCe = (l_x)pe = P*, 
where P* indicates a hypothetical, nonobserved competitive price 
(since a monopolist would not charge as Iowa price as P*). 
12. J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 10, at 113-16. 
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Profit maximization for a monopolist occurs at the output where MR = 
MC*; we use the well-known relationship to express marginal cost in 
terms of elasticity of demand at the profit-maximizing rate of output: 13 
1 
(3) MR = MC = pM (1 - ~), or 
7') 
MC* 7')M-I M 7')M 
(4) -- = or P = MC* 
PM 'YlM ' M .• 7') -1 
To facilitate deriving the relationship between 7')M and 7')c, it is conve-
nient to derive and use the relationships between 7')M and 7')* and be-
tween 7')c and 7')*: 





(6) 7')* = AP* = 2(pM_p*) 
(using (Ib), (Ic), and properties of congruent triangles). 14 
(6), and (4), we can then derive: 
7')M 2pM 27')M 
-=--=---;thus 
7')* P* 7')M-I 
(7) 
(8) 7')M = 27')* + 1 
Using (5), 
Similarly, using (lc), (2), and the definition of an x-percent decrease in 
marginal cost, we obtain: 
(l-x)PC 
(9) 
APC + xPc 





From (8) and (10), we derive: 
2(1-x)7')c 





We can now ask under what conditions a merger leading to a de-
crease of x percent in marginal costs and transforming an industry from 
competitive to monopoly pricing would lead to a lower price. As we 
13. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 129. 
14. Id. at 125; J. H1RSHLElFER, supra note 10, at 119. 
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noted at the beginning of the Mterword, this search is equivalent to 
inquiring under what conditions 1"Jc > 1"JM, or when 
2(1-x)1"Jc 





Thus, as long as the percentage decrease in MC (denoted x) is larger 
than ~ -that is, as long as the percentage decrease in MC is larger 
1"J 
than the reciprocal of the premerger price elasticity-the monopoly 
price will be less than the competitive price. IS Since x cannot exceed 1 
(i.e., 100%), this condition can only arise when 1"Jc > 1. 
A merger would have to produce extraordinarily large cost savings 
to permit the same or lower prices from monopoly than from a pre-
merger competitive situation. For example, for an initial industry elas-
ticity of demand (1"JC) of 1 at the competitive output, cost savings would 
have to equal or exceed 100% (an impossible result); for 1"Jc of 1.5, cost 
savings would have to equal or exceed 67%; for 1"Jc of 2, 50%; for 1"Jc of 
3, 33%; for 1"Jc of 4, 25%. If one were to follow. the congressional dictate 
of not permitting any merger reasonably likely to raise consumer 
prices, and one believed that the elasticity of demand for an industry at 
the competitive level would rarely exceed 4,16 the optimal policy would 
be to oppose any mergers reasonably likely to transform an industry 
from competitive to monopoly pricing. Cost savings of 25% to 100% 
seem too large to expect, except under truly remarkable 
circumstances. 17 
In his characterization of the market-power/efficiencies tradeoff, 
an approach that all subsequent analysts have followed, Williamson 
IS. Rewriting equation (14) as x'l') C > I, we can give the following interpretation. The quan-
tity x'l') C equals the percentage change in the competitive output due to an x-percent decrease in 
marginal cost, for the simple case of constant marginal costs. Given that for a linear demand the 
monopoly output is always one-half of the competitive output, E. MANSFIELD, supra note I, at 
126, for the monopoly output after cost reduction to be larger than the old competitive output, the 
new competitive output must be at least twice the old competitive output. Under this condition, 
the ratio of the hypothetical new output to the competitive output, 
Q*_QC 
QC" 
with Q* > 2QC, will be larger than one. 
16. Empirical work shows elasticities of demand for successful brands of consumer products 
to be in the 1 to IS range, with the majority between 2 and 5. L. TELSER, COMPETITION, COLLU-
SION AND GAME THEORY 274-306 (1972). The interpretation of this evidence is very controver-
sial, however, and industry demands are less elastic than demands for individual brands. For a 
discussion, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 2, at 1642-43 nn.212-14. 
17. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 2, at 1599-624. Further, the historical record is that 
predictions of efficiencies from mergers have been extremely unrealistic. Id. at 1609-24. 
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assumed that a merger would raise price and looked at the cost savings 
necessary to offset allocative efficiency losses, ignoring any wealth-
transfer effects.18 A switch in focus to the congressional concern with 
price itself, including an allowance for the possibility that a merger 
might facilitate industrywide collusion, changes the results dramati-
cally. For example, for an elasticity of demand of2, Williamson calcu-
lated that cost savings of 0.27% to 5.76% would offset the allocative 
inefficiency of price increases of 5% to 20%.19 In sharp contrast, for a 
demand elasticity of 2, marginal cost would have to fall by 50% to en-
sure that a merger facilitating industrywide collusion did not permit 
prices to increase. To state these results somewhat differently, if one 
performs the market-power/efficiencies tradeoff in accordance with 
congressional intent, the anticipated cost savings necessary to compen-
sate for monopoly power increase greatly: by a factor of close to 3 at 
high elasticities of demand and by a factor of 40 as the demand elastic-
ity approaches 1. 
The assumptions underlying Equation (14) are admittedly very ex-
treme. One departure would be to predetermine a certain amount of 
acceptable price increase for mergers expected to result in important 
efficiencies.20 For example, the Justice Department's 1982 Merger 
Guidelines21 essentially consider anticipated price increases ofless than 
5% too small to merit antitrust intervention.22 Based on this kind of 
reasoning, how much would marginal costs have to decrease to prevent 
a firm gaining monopoly power from raising price more than some 
stated percentage? Our model allows us to answer this question, using 
the same assumptions. To proceed, we start by deriving R, the maxi-




R ~ ----::--pc 




pM = (I-x) pc .......,...:.1')_ 
1')M-I 
M C M 
P -p l-x1') 
----- = pc 1')M-l 
18. Williamson, supra note 4. 
19. Williamson, supra note 1, at 709 table 1, reprinted in Fisher & Lande, supra note 2, at 
1630 table IV-I. 
20. For an argument that this policy would be unwise, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 2. 
For an opposing view, see Muris, supra note 1. 
21. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (1982), reprinted in 2 
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 4501, at 6881-6 (Aug. 9, 1982). 
22. Id. § II(A), 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,494, 2 TRADE REG. REp. (CCH) ~ 4502, at 6881-8. 
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using (2) and (4), subtracting pc from both sides of (16), and dividing 
by pc. Then (17), (11), and simplification yield 
(18) 
By setting (18) equal to x, we can derive the percentage decrease in 





Equation (19) underlies the figures in Table 1. 
Table 1 
The Relationship Between Cost Savings and Final Price: 
Maximum Estimates for Merger to Monopoly* 
Percentage 
Change in Elasticity of Demand at the Competitive Price 
Price 
4 3 2 
+30% NA NA NA 40 
+20% NA NA 10 60 
+10% 5 13.3 30 80 
+5% 15 23.3 40 90 
0 25 33.3 50 100 
-5% 35 43.3 60 
-10% 45 53.3 70 
-20% 65 73.3 90 
-30% 85 93.3 
* This table shows the percentage decrease in marginal costs necessary to result in the 
indicated percentage changes in price, for various elasticities of demand, under the ex-
treme assumption that the merger in question transforms the industry from perfectly 
competitive to monopoly (or perfectly collusive) pricing. 
Notes: 
1. NA indicates that for the elasticity of demand in question (measured at the competitive 
price), a monopolist would not raise price by that great a percentage above the compet-
itive price. 
2. - indicates that no reduction in marginal costs would be sufficient to induce a monopo-
list to reduce price to this extent below the competitive price, given the elasticity of 
demand. 
3. The required cost savings as shown refer to industry costs. Therefore, for a merger 
permitting price changes for all firms but cost savings for only the merging firms, the 
figures in this table must be divided by the merging firms' combined market share. In 
such a case, the cost savings required to yield price changes as shown could be much 
greater than indicated by the table. 
Source: Equation (19). 
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To illustrate Equation (19), suppose that antitrust enforcers fol-
lowed the spirit of the 1982 Merger Guidelines and agreed to permit an 
acquisition likely to confer a monopoly on the merging parties as long 
as the enforcers could confidently predict that the price increase would 
not exceed 5%. Equation (19) shows that such a merger would have to 
yield 15%, cost savings for llc of 4; 23% for llc of 3; 40% for llc of 2; 
and 90% for llc of 1. Table 1 performs this analysis for maximum per-
missible price increases of 0% to 30% and for more interventionist deci-
sion rules that would only permit mergers to create a monopoly if price 
were expected to fall by 5% to 30%. ' 
In summary, this Afterword extends the antitrust literature on the 
market-power/efficiencies tradeoff by switching the focus. Economic 
analysis of enforcement policy is most likely to influence the courts if it 
operates within the methodology imposed by the congressional man-
date in the enabling legislation. The antitrust laws impose a wealth-
transfer constraint; decisionmakers must maximize economic efficiency 
subject to this constraint. We therefore compute the cost savings neces-
sary to guarantee that a merger with the maximum possible anticompe-
titive effect (transforming an industry from competitive to monopoly 
pricing) would not raise consumer prices, or would not raise prices 
more than some predetermined maximum percentage. Although it is 
possible under our extreme assumptions for a merger creating a mo-
nopoly to have sufficient efficiencies to lead to lower consumer prices, 
such a result would require impossibly large efficiencies and rather 
large elasticities of demand. Under less extreme assumptions, however, 
a merger that increased market power could lead to lower consumer 
prices with much smaller efficiencies, at a level that one could expect 
under more normal conditions.23 
Although our analysis directly concerns only merger policy, it has 
profound implications for many other areas of antitrust law, such as 
monopolization/predation, in which the literature ignores effects on 
final consumer prices and wealth transfers.24 Our analysis also applies 
to other areas of law and economics, such as regulation, in which 
23. For a very simple example, if we believed that there was a 20% probability that a merger 
would transform an industry from competitive to monopoly pricing and an 80% probability that 
the industry would remain competitive, the required efficiencies would be 80% smaller, assuming 
that we were willing to base policy on expected values of wealth transfers and efficiencies and 
were willing to ignore incipiency concerns. For a discussion of the results under less extreme 
assumptions, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 2, at 1624-51-
24, For example, the lengthy volume ten of The Journal of Reprints for Antitrust Law and 
Economics, which was devoted to predation, contained no analysis of a methodology to weigh 
wealth transfers and efficiencies in this context. For a rare exception, see Zerbe and Cooper, An 
Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REv. 655 (1982). 
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policymakers frequently face tradeoffs between efficiencies and wealth-
transfer effects. 
The calculations in this Afterword provide definite amounts of 
cost savings necessary to follow the dictates of Congress. The precision 
in the numbers, however, is purely theoretical and illustrative. In prac-
tice, all the parameters in the equations are subject to imprecision and 
require estimation or informed guesses. Whether the theoretical mod-
els and the skills of antitrust enforcers and courts are sufficiently relia-
ble to form the basis for case-by-case balancing of efficiencies and 
market power is another, far more complex issue.25 
25. For the case in favor of a case-by-case efficiencies defense, see Muris, supra note I, at 
416-31; for the case against a case-by-case approach, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 2. 
